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Abstract: Argumentation schemes are forms of argument that capture
stereotypical patterns of human reasoning, especially defeasible ones like
argument from expert opinion, that have proved troublesome to view
deductively or inductively. Much practical work has already been done
on argumentation schemes, proving their worth in  [19], but more pre-
cise investigations are needed to formalize their structures. The problem
posed in this paper is what form justification of a given scheme, as hav-
ing a certain precise structure of inference, should take. It is argued that
defeasible argumentation schemes require both a systematic and a prag-
matic justification, of a kind that can only be provided by the case study
method of collecting key examples of arguments of the types tradition-
ally classified as fallacies, and subjecting them to comparative examina-
tion and analysis. By this method, postulated structures for schemes can
be formulated as hypotheses to solve three kinds of problems: (1) how
to classify such arguments into different types, (2) how to identify their
premises and conclusions, and (3) how to formulate the critical questions
used to evaluate each type of argument.
1 
On September 19, 2004, I gave a lecture on informal logic and argumentation
to the graduate students of the Institute of Logic and Cognition at Sun Yat-
sen University in Guangzhou, China.1 The subject of the lecture included an
account of argumentation schemes representing common forms of argument
that are neither deductive nor inductive. During the question period, Wen
Xue-Feng, a PhD student, asked an interesting question: how were the argu-
mentation schemes constructed? I took this question to ask not just about
where the schemes come from, but also about their justification. I replied
1I would like to thank Professor Liang Qing-yin for making this visit possible, and to thank
Xiong Minghui, Zhang Nanning, Tang Ling-yun and David Godden for discussions.
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that the schemes came from studying many examples of arguments, especially
ones associated with informal fallacies, and from finding patterns and struc-
ture common to these arguments.2 That answer seems to me basically right,
but on reflection it seemed to me that it is incomplete, and that considerable
elaboration is required to explain the point of it. The purpose of this paper is
to provide that elaboration.
Classical deductive logic has been proved to be consistent and complete.
Although the argument structure common to argumentation schemes has been
formalized [10], the completeness problem for them has not yet been solved.
Hence, as will be shown here, although it is not possible yet to offer a complete
systematic justification of them, they can be given a pragmatic justification.
2   ?
Schemes have a long history. Aristotle’s listings of common forms of argu-
mentation called topics (places) in Topics, On Sophistical Refutations [1,3] and
Rhetoric [2] represent the first systematic attempt to give an account of schemes.
After Aristotle, the topics evolved into various forms, but there seemed to be
little agreement on what they were, or what they should be used for. Often they
were seen as devices for argument invention, perhaps useful mainly in rhetoric.
It wasn’t until the twentieth century that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca em-
ployed argumentation schemes, in The New Rhetoric [7], as tools for analyzing
and evaluating arguments used in everyday and legal discourse. Schemes now
had a new role.3 Schemes have now proved to be a central tool in argumenta-
tion theory (informal logic) used to analyze informal fallacies.
Arthur Hastings, in his PhD thesis [5] at Northwestern University, pro-
vided the first systematic analysis of common argumentation schemes. He pre-
sented a format representing the premises and conclusion of each scheme with
a set of critical questions matching the scheme. He presented one premise
of each presumptive scheme as a defeasible conditional in the form of a Toul-
min [14] warrant. Many of these Hastings-style argumentation schemes were
used in the analysis of argumentative discourse in van Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst [15, 16]. Recent classifications of argumentation schemes includes the
extensive account of Kienpointner [6], who included deductive and inductive
schemes, and the analysis of many of the twenty-six common presumptive
schemes was given byWalton [21]. Current research aims to construct a system-
atic methodology for classifying schemes and for analyzing the formal structure
of each scheme in a precise system. To amplify these points, it is helpful to look
at one particular argumentation scheme as an example.
2I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
for a research grant, ‘Argumentation Schemes in Natural and Artificial Communication’, that
supported this work.
3Warnick [26] has provided a systematic list comparing Aristotle’s topics with the argumen-
tation schemes identified by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in The New Rhetoric [7].
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A leading example of a presumptive argumentation scheme is the one rep-
resenting argument from expert opinion [22]. This form of argument was tra-
ditionally classified as a fallacy, but recent developments have borne out the
thesis that it is often a reasonable form of argument, even though it is fallible,
and sometimes notoriously subject to misuse as a deceptive argumentation tac-
tic. Argument from expert opinion can be a reasonable argument if it meets
the conditions displayed in the following argument form, where A is a proposi-
tion, E is an expert, and D is a domain of knowledge.
     
E is an expert in domain D.
E asserts that A is known to be true.
A is within D.
Therefore, A may plausibly be taken to be true.
The three premises in this scheme represent assumptions that, if justified as
acceptable in a given case, warrant the drawing of a defeasible inference war-
ranting provisional acceptance of the conclusion. However, if someone who
is skeptical about the inference asks any one of the following six critical ques-
tions [22], the argument from expert opinion defaults until the question has
been answered.
       
Expertise: How credible is E as an expert source?
Field: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
Opinion: What did E assert that implies A?
Trustworthiness: Is E personally reliable as a source?
Consistency: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
Backup Evidence: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
Acceptance or rejection of the argument from expert opinion thus rests on a
balance of considerations in a case. If a respondent asks any one of the six
appropriate critical questions, a burden of proof is shifted back onto the pro-
ponent of the argument to provide a satisfactory answer to the question. If
she fails to give such an answer, the appeal to expert opinion loses its previous
weight of support. Only if the question has been answered does the appeal
to expert opinion have a restored weight of presumption in its favor. Thus
the evaluation of any given argument from expert opinion involves not just
the semantic form of the argument, but also contextual factors such as how
the argument is placed in an ongoing dialogue where questions are asked and
answered.
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3  
When one asks the question of how a scheme can be justified, one is usually
thinking of a defeasible scheme, like argument from expert opinion. Such a
scheme, as has been shown [25], cannot be well analyzed as being a deductive
or inductive form of argument. But the same kind of questions can be asked,
and have been asked, about deductive and inductive forms of argument. The
question, ‘How can inductive reasoning be justified?’ has been a frequently
discussed topic in philosophy, and there have even been parallel discussions on
how or whether deductive reasoning can be justified. These questions have
turned out to be harder to answer that one might initially think.
We can sharpen such questions by putting them in a more specific format.
For example, we can ask how a particular form of argument, like modus ponens,
can be justified. Presumably, pursuing any serious attempt to answer this ques-
tion takes us to general considerations about deductive propositional logic as
a whole system. First, we have to define validity for this class of arguments,
and then we have to show how the material conditional (the hook of classical
propositional logic) is defined in terms of truth values of propositions. Once
all this has been done, it is then fairly easy to prove that modus ponens is a valid
form of inference, and is therefore justified. What is shown, to put it briefly,
is that deductively valid forms of inference are truth preserving, meaning that
if the premises are true, the conclusion also necessarily has to be true. Then
given the truth-functional definition of the hook, it can easily be shown that all
inferences having the form modus ponens are truth preserving. Similar kinds of
systematic justification can be carried out in cases of inductive inference. First,
some general theory is offered of how inductive inferences can be evaluated as
strong or weak in terms of probability values. Second, conditional probability,
and other inferential forms like conjunctive and disjunctive probability, are de-
fined, for example, by Bayesian axioms. Then a particular form of inductive
argument can be justified, or not, based on this system.
How can such a systematic program of justification be applied, in a com-
parable way, to argumentation schemes like argument from expert opinion that
are neither deductively valid nor inductively strong? The answer is that there
is no widely accepted and established system yet in place for evaluating such
argumentation schemes, because the problem of building a system for analysis
and evaluation of such forms of argument has not yet been solved. The prob-
lem of building a system to analyze the structure of defeasible arguments like
‘Birds fly; Tweety is bird; therefore Tweety flies’ remains unsolved, even though
there have been many theories put forward in computing [8]. Some parts of
the solution to the problem have been provided by recent developments in
argumentation theory, however.
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4     
The next point to be made is that argument from expert opinion, like any
presumptive scheme, can be formulated in a modus ponens format in which the
warrant supporting the inference as a generalization can be expressed in the
form of a conditional. In such an alternate version [25], an implicit conditional
premise that links the explicit premises stated in the scheme above has been
added.
    (modus ponens version)
E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.
E asserts that proposition A, in domain S, is true.
A is within D.
If E is an expert
in a subject domain S containing proposition A,
and E asserts that proposition A is true,
then A may plausibly be taken to be true.
Therefore, A may plausibly be taken to be true.
The modus ponens version is not a deductively valid argument. To see this we
can follow the analysis of Verheij [18] who drew a proof-theoretic distinction
between two rule-based forms of inference, presented below:
   ()
As a universal rule not subject to exceptions, if A then B.
A is true.
Conclusion: B is true.
   ()
As a rule subject to exceptions, if A then B
A holds as true.
It is not the case so far that there is a known exception
to the rule that if A then B.
Conclusion: B holds tentatively,
but subject to withdrawal should an exception arise.
Strict modus ponens is a deductively valid form of argument of the kind widely
known and accepted as valid in logic. What is less widely accepted is thatmodus
ponens can also have a non-strict, or defeasible, form that can be reasonable in
some cases even though it is not deductively valid when applied in these cases.
These two schemes need to be applied differently in different kinds of cases.
Verheij [18], recommended the following policy for applying them. In a case
where both strict rules and rules not admitting of exceptions might possibly
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come into play, defeasible modus ponensmust always be used. In a case in which
only universal rules that are not subject to exceptions are involved, strict modus
ponens suffices as the appropriate rule of inference. Although the conclusion is
really the same in both forms of argument, the qualifier ‘tentatively, but sub-
ject to withdrawal should an exception arise’ is stated in the conclusion part of
, indicating that the inferential relation between the premises and the con-
clusion is different in this kind of modus ponens argument. The reason for this
feature has to do with recognizing each type of argument as distinct from the
other based on “indicator words” [13]. This problem, often called “translation”
in formal logic, is discussed below.
The acknowledgment of  as being a species of modus ponens inference
is heretical in logic, as it implies that there can be modus ponens arguments that
are not deductively valid. The general policy of the currently prevailing logic
textbooks is to only consider modus ponens inferences that are deductively valid
and to classify many of the arguments fitting the  scheme above under the
 form. For example, Copi and Cohen, in their leading textbook [4, p. 363]
instruct their students that the statement, ‘If he has a good lawyer then he
will be acquitted’ should be symbolized using the hook (the symbol for the ma-
terial conditional) as the connective. Using this symbolization, the following
argument they offer as an example is said to have the  form.
  
If he has a good lawyer then he will be acquitted.
He has a good lawyer.
Therefore he will be acquitted.
The conditional expressed in the first premise, however, is better seen as based
on a defeasible rule rather than a strict one. It doesn’t mean that if he has a
good lawyer, it must follow in all instances that he will be acquitted, no matter
how the trial goes. It surely means, on the best interpretation, that if he has
a good lawyer then, on a balance of considerations, all else being equal in the
case, he will be acquitted. For any such rule is subject to exceptions. You could
have a good lawyer, but all the evidence supports the other side, and the judge
sees that. Or you could have a good lawyer, but the other side could have an
even better one.
The problem is that we are so accustomed to seeing modus ponens as a form
of argument that is deductively valid that the recognition of  as a legiti-
mate form of argument will be conceded only very reluctantly by those com-
mitted to formal logic as the tool of choice for the evaluation of arguments.
The committed formal logician will argue that the consequent of a true condi-
tional can never be false when the antecedent is true. So, in all cases where the
antecedent condition (asserted in the first premise) and the consequent condi-
tion asserted as the conclusion turn out to be false, the conditional itself must
also have been false. Suppose that in the case of the lawyer argument, the other
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side has a better lawyer who, as things turn out, wins the case. That outcome
would defeat the  argument above. But according to the viewpoint of the
committed formal logician, the conditional premise, as things turned out, was
not really true. Therefore, according to this viewpoint, it was not “true” in the
strict sense. On this viewpoint, the conditional can only be (strictly speaking)
true if it is true in all circumstances, and otherwise it is false. However, using
the lawyer argument and many similar cases as examples, the advocate of 
will argue that the conditional does not need to be treated exclusively in this
strict way in all cases.
Once we recognize two types of conditionals, another problem is how to
distinguish between them. For example, is the conditional represented by the
sentence ‘If Bill comes to the party tonight, he’ll come before 8:00 pm’ of
the kind that supports an  or  argument? Here, as with any case of
interpreting an argument in a natural language text of discourse, we have to
look at the evidence in that text. For example, suppose part of the evidence
is that the speaker backed up her argument by claiming that Bill told me that
if he’s coming he’ll be there before 8pm. Should this conditional be taken as
a universal assertion meant to hold without exceptions, or one that is subject
to exceptions? Since it is based only on what Bill said, it could fail. Bill could
be mistaken, or he could have lied, for example. Thus it makes more sense,
in this instance, to treat the conditional as a defeasible one. However, each
case is different, and the problem is one of interpreting a natural language text
of discourse. In formal logic, such problems are treated under the heading of
“translation” of a natural language into a formal language.
The same kind of problem arises in formal logic in judging, in a given case,
whether a conditional that should be taken as a material conditional or as a
strict conditional of the kind represented in modal logic by a necessity oper-
ator governing a statement containing a material conditional. It should be
stated as well that the problem of differentiating between different kinds of ar-
guments having structures comparable to modus ponens affects generalizations
and quantifiers as well. Some generalizations are strict (meaning not subject
to exceptions) and are well represented by the universal quantifer of classical
logic. Many generalizations (to offer a generalization) are defeasible, because
they are meant to be subject to exceptions of a kind that cannot always be
identified in advance.
The remaining problem is that  cannot be analyzed by means of a
context-free truth table in the way that  has been in deductive logic. 
could hold at one point in an ongoing collection of data in an investigation. But
then later, as new evidence comes in, it might default. Thus  needs to be
analyzed and evaluated not only in light of its logical form, but also in light of
a context of investigation in which a conclusion can be accepted at one point,
but then rejected at a later point. There are some resources in argumentation
theory that can be used to model this notion of an argument used in a context.
In particular, the notion of argumentation as a sequence of moves made by two
Douglas Walton, “Justification of Argument Schemes”, Australasian Journal of Logic (3) 2005, 1–13
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2005 8
participants in a goal-directed dialogue is central. In a nutshell,  needs a
pragmatic structure for argument evaluation.
5  
Argumentation schemes of the defeasible type that are the central focus of
justification attempts here require a pragmatic justification because they repre-
sent arguments used for some purpose in a given conversational context. This
pragmatic dimension requires that such arguments need to be examined within
the context of an ongoing investigation in dialogue in which questions are be-
ing asked and answered. Because context is important in a given case, the
collection and analysis of case studies is more significant than it is in context-
free deductive and inductive logics. The premises and conclusion are the core
of an argument to be evaluated, but how this central argument is being used
to convince an opponent, or to prove the conclusion by collecting evidence,
are also important. For this reason, an argumentation scheme needs to have
a pragmatic justification as well as a systematic one. This means that the col-
lection and analysis of examples of the use of a particular type of argument
in varying contexts is a required part of the analysis and justification of any
scheme being studied. We can no longer take for granted that schemes like
argument from expert opinion can routinely be classified as fallacies. We now
need to address the hard task of considering each individual case on its merits,
and build criteria that will aid in judging whether the given case is reasonable
or fallacious.
All of the research on fallacies conducted over the past thirty years has
been based on the same methodology [20]. It begins with the collection of
data in the form of selection of examples of arguments of the type being stud-
ied. These are real examples of arguments taken from newspaper editorials,
television news reports, and so forth. Each example is recorded as an exact
quotation so that what you have is a text of discourse in natural language with
its source carefully documented. Taking each individual case as unique, a pre-
liminary attempt is made to do three things to identify the argument in the
case, to analyze it, and to evaluate it as strong, weak or fallacious. Such a
preliminary attempt can be seen as a rough hypothesis, not yet guided by any
precise theory. However, as noted above, a dialectical theory of argumentation
has arisen out of these practical efforts to analyze individual fallacies.
Using the dialectical approach, each individual case of an argument needs
to be analyzed and evaluated not just as a semantic form, but as an argument
used for some purpose in a conversational setting. The conversational setting
is represented by a formal dialogue structure in which a proponent and a re-
spondent take turns making moves. The proponent puts forward an argument
designed to incur the commitment of the respondent to the conclusion. But
the argument can be, and often is defeasible, meaning that the respondent can
make objections to it and ask critical questions [12]. The argument and its
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reply need to evaluated as a pair of moves, on a balance of considerations in
a dialogue setting that allows new evidence to come in at a later point. This
means that pragmatic factors, like burden of proof, can play a role in the evalu-
ation of the argument as strong, weak or fallacious.
It should also be mentioned however that in addition to case study anal-
ysis and formal dialectical systems, there is another form of justification for
schemes that bridges the pragmatic and the systematic. New technology in
distributed computing has been built on argumentation schemes, especially
in multi-agent computing, where rational software agents need to engage in
interactive communication, including the speech acts of putting forward an
argument and questioning it [27]. One development worth mentioning is a
formal and implemented model of argumentation schemes in agent commu-
nication [10]. In this work, a method of formalizing schemes is put forward
that is implementable in computing but is also close to the richness of natural
language argumentation. The formalization is based on the implementation
of an Argument Markup Language () originally developed as part of the
Araucaria software tool for argument diagramming [9].4
Themethod represents a formalization of schemes that includes both famil-
iar deductive schemes like modus ponens and defeasible schemes like argument
from expert opinion. This formal tool is being combined with the case study
technique of analyzing arguments from natural language discourse. Araucaria
now has a database that can be used to access existing examples, along with
analyses of them provided by other users, and to enter new examples and analy-
ses of them. This current research in computing is formal, but at the same time
practical, because it is used for practical purposes in computing, and because
it requires an approximation to natural language argumentation. It combines
systematic and pragmatic justification of argumentation schemes.
6 
The first conclusion that needs to be stated is negative and cautionary. What
needs to be stated is that there is a completeness problem for defeasible argu-
mentation schemes that has not yet been solved. So far, the study of schemes
like argument from expert opinion makes the account of the scheme open
to the possibility that the process of critical questioning could go on and on
without any clearly defined stopping point. Thus the issue needs to be raised
whether the argument from expert opinion can be established in any given case
as an argument in which the premises offer solid evidence supporting the con-
clusion. It is often possible to ask subquestions of the basic critical questions.
But if a scheme cannot generally be closed off to further critical questioning
(because of defeasibility), how can schemes be justified as representing forms
4The Araucaria software can be downloaded at no cost from the following location on the
internet: http://www.computing.dundee.ac.uk/staff/creed/araucaria.
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of rational argument in which the premises provide evidence for accepting the
conclusion?
Suppose that a proponent has put forward an argument from expert opin-
ion for example. The way towards a solution needs to be based on the dialecti-
cal premise that the appeal to expert opinion should never be regarded as com-
plete and closed to further questioning, until the dialogue itself has reached
the closing stage. This proposed solution implies that asking of critical ques-
tions in a given case depends on the type of dialogue in the case, the stage
the dialogue is in, and the conditions governing closure of the dialogue. What
makes defeasible arguments different from deductive ones, as noted above, is
their lack of completeness as used in many cases, meaning that the dialogue on
the argument offered earlier in a case may need to re-opened if new evidence
comes into the case. For example, critical questioning of an argument from
expert opinion needs in many common cases to be seen as open-ended. Case
studies of this kind of argument have shown that the fallacy of ad verecundiam
typically consists in the closing off of the respondent’s critical questioning too
hastily by the proponent.
This proposal for solving the completeness problem needs to be developed
at two levels. At one level, basic critical questions can be asked. At another
level, critical subquestions that bring out more specific aspects of the basic crit-
ical questions can be asked. Thus according to this proposal, the solution to
the completeness problem will come from the dialectical analysis of argumen-
tation schemes. Each scheme needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
in the context of dialogue appropriate for how the argument was used in that
case. The analyst needs to examine the text of discourse in the given case
to determine how far along the process of critical questioning has proceeded.
This data is to be used in determining whether closure of the dialogue can be
assumed or not, and what stage the dialogue is in. The structure for systematic
justification is not yet fully established, because the completeness problem has
not yet fully been solved. More generally, the problem of evaluating defeasi-
ble argumentation has not yet been fully solved, even though there are many
theories of it in computing, where it is a central problem for . However, it
was argued above that the best approach to solving these two closely related
problems is the theory of formal dialogue systems offered by argumentation
theory.
As argued above, defeasible argumentation schemes like argument from ex-
pert opinion require both a systematic and a pragmatic justification. It was
argued that pragmatic justification is provided by the case study method of
collecting key examples of arguments of the kinds traditionally classified as fal-
lacies and subjecting them to comparative examination and analysis. Through
the study of many such examples, general principles can be formulated as hy-
potheses to solve the problems of how to classify such arguments into different
types, how to identify their premises and conclusions, and how to specify the
critical questions that need to be asked in relation to each type.
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These hypotheses represent the current state of the art, the tools needed
to analyze and evaluate individual cases of the use of these argument types.
As more and more cases are collected and analyzed, these analytical tools are
sharpened and the principles they represent are refined.
It should be observed that neither type of justification is yet complete, as
the study of fallacies and argumentation schemes is still underway, and is a
growing, but still relatively newly cultivated field. Nonetheless, each form of
justification, systematic and pragmatic, has resources that have been built up.
Many of the most important fallacies, like argument from expert opinion, have
now been studied in some depth. The many examples of this type of argument
that have now been collected and analyzed form a body of case studies. Lessons
have emerged from them, increasing our knowledge of how these arguments
work, and what factors are important in evaluating them. Thus resources are in
place that can support pragmatic justification of many of the schemes that have
now been identified and studied. As for systematic justification, although the
problem of defeasibility cannot realistically be thought of as having been en-
tirely solved, the dialectical structures provided by formal models of dialogue
systems offer a framework that seems to be the best route to a solution.
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